In the first part of my final blog post I briefly discussed the migrant population of Iran and specifically addressed the importance of Iran as a labor migration destination for Afghans. For the final portion of my post, I will be examining what happens when a nation is so devastated economically that it cannot support even its lowest paid migrant working class.
Reliance on the Rial
In 2019 over 2 million Iranian jobs were occupied by Afghan migrants who sent a total of between $3.35 billion and $5.58 billion home each year.9 In Iran, Afghan labor migrants used to make on average four times the pay they would if they were working in Afghanistan.1 However, this has drastically changed with the inflation of the rial. The Iranian inflation rate was predicted to reach 40% by the end of 2019 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).2 The organization did not account for the impact of the impending coronavirus pandemic, which consequently worsened the Iranian economy on all fronts. These factors have had the effect of the extreme devaluing of the rial.
In 2018 alone, the Iranian rial lost 70% of its value.5 The Afghan afghani now holds more value than the rial, as the worth of the afghani is approximately 0.013 of one United States Dollar (USD) compared to the rial’s worth at 0.000002 of one USD.12 Because the USD is also often used as currency in Afghanistan, Afghans additionally view their earnings relative to the American currency.4 As the rial is worth far less than both of these currencies, the purchasing power of the rial in Afghanistan has decreased exponentially. For those living in Afghanistan who receive remittances from a family member in Iran, the cost of living has gone up as the rial no longer has the ability to stretch as far as it used to. On top of the massive decrease in value, cuts to salaries have become necessary evils for the labor migrants. A grocery store worker named Abdul Saboor reported having his wages reduced by his Isfahani employer from 280 dollars per month to less than 100 dollars a month. As he could no longer support his family, he returned to Afghanistan in 2019.4
While there is evidence that lower-income countries like Afghanistan only receive 5% of total global remittances6, there is no doubt that remittances sent from abroad, and in particular from Iran, are an integral part of Afghanistan’s economy and the livelihoods of its people. Nick Bishop, an emergency-response officer for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) stated in 2018 that “‘As all Afghans (living in Iran) typically send home the main parts of their earnings in the form of monthly remittances, the Afghan economy itself will suffer direct and immediate effects.”‘4 Unsurprisingly, he was correct. By 2019 the implications of a decrease in remittances had adversely impacted the Afghan provinces of Herat, Badghis, and Ghor. 5
Afghan labor migrants who return home are sure to face another problem: the dependence of the Afghan economy on Iran. Iran has become Afghanistan’s largest trading partner with a trade relationship worth $2 billion in 2017.4 The decline of the Iranian economy has directly influenced the Afghan economy and will continue to bring it down as conditions in Iran worsen. In addition, Afghanistan may become a proxy in Iran’s fight against U.S. sanctions. It has been predicted by D.C. analysts that the Iranian government could push back against the United States by increasing its support of the Taliban.4 Afghans migrants face exceedingly harsh conditions whether they choose to stay in Iran or to return to Afghanistan.
Labor and Layoffs
While many Afghan labor migrants hold jobs in the informal economy of Iran, those who are documented and/or have work permits issued by the Iranian government generally participate in sectors that involve strenuous labor.1
A 2011 study found that of the Afghan migrant men registered with the Iranian state, 28% were construction workers, 29% were day laborers, and 3% worked in the agricultural industry. 1The majority of women worked as seamstresses (48%) or as day laborers (32%).1In addition, The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and the Collective for Social Science Research found that:
“Iranian employers hire Afghan workers for their high sense of responsibility and dedication, their readiness for difficult and hazardous jobs as well as their acceptance of lower wages compared to Iranians. Undefined regulations for employing Afghans coupled with difficulties in employing national workers further incentivize Iranian employers to hire Afghans.”1
In this way, Afghan migrants are often exploited and seen as easily replaceable by Iranian employers. In Iran’s informal economy, demand for labor has decreased dramatically. 7 This has naturally led to wage reduction and termination for many Afghan migrants, as they constitute a large percentage of Iran’s informal labor force. The irregular status of many Afghan workers is a double-edged sword. While Afghan labor migrants were able to earn relatively more in Iran, as explained by the dual labor market theory6 and as we’ve continually discussed throughout this semester, the modern global economic system favors cheap and disposable labor. As there is little to no regulation or formality connecting Afghan migrants to their jobs, they can be let go as easily as they are hired. Additionally, the exceedingly high Iranian unemployment rate points to the fact that the Iranian economy, hamstrung by sanctions and the coronavirus, is not healthy enough to retain as many workers as needed overall. Under circumstances where Iran is not in economic crisis, employers can lower wages of Afghan workers with little backlash due to the precarious nature of their employment. However, some recent salary reductions have reduced pay to levels that migrants are unable to subsist off of. This has incentivized Afghans to leave their jobs and the country, which will directly negatively impact the Iranian economy. Tehrani economist and political analyst, Saeed Leylaz concluded that “Afghans typically took harsh, labor-intensive jobs in Iran and their departure will mean higher production costs.”5
Return Migration
So how have Afghan migrants responded to the devaluing of the rial, increased unemployment, and reduction of salaries in Iran? The answer is mass migration. From the years 2017 to 2018, the amount of Afghans who left Iran increased by 40%.9 By August of 2018, 440,000 Afghans had left Iran4, and by the end of that very year a total of more than 770,000 Afghans had exited the country.5 It was predicted that by the end of 2019, at least 570,000 more Afghan migrants would depart from Iran.5 By September of 2020, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded a total of 571,800 undocumented Afghan returnees.10 When considering that the Iranian government estimated the Afghan migrant population at 2.5 to 3 million people, this level of exodus essentially cut the number of Afghans residing in Iran in half. 5
This resulting return migration flipped the concept of relative deprivation as it pertains to the Afghan-Iranian migration relationship on its head. Due to the extreme nature of its current economic depression, Iran is arguably no longer a comparatively desirable destination for Afghan migrants. Even though the Afghan unemployment rate was at 40% in 20184, the idea of returning to one’s homeland still seemed like a better option for many Afghan labor migrants rather than struggling to pay for basic necessities in Iran. Due to Afghanistan’s close economic ties with Iran however, the choice to return to the country is looking less and less like a survivable decision for many. That being said, where does the theory of relative deprivation refocus the flow of these migrants if not to Iran or Pakistan?
A Migrant Crisis on the Horizon?
Afghan migrants are increasingly leaving Iran in favor of Turkey.
The consensus is that these migrants are using Turkey as a point through which to enter Europe.9 Afghanistan’s infrastructure simply cannot support the amount of workers returning home, so migrants leaving Iran have been looking towards Europe.8 The Afghan population in Iran has expressed desires to have the end goal of their migration be resettlement on the continent. A 2016 survey carried out by the Iranian state found that about 1.6 million or 60% of Afghans in Iran would like to migrate to Europe.9 This aspiration paired with increasing numbers of Afghans crossing the border into Turkey has raised concerns of the possibility of another upcoming migrant crisis.
Pre- Covid 19, some Iranian officials saw this looming crisis as a potential pawn in the play to have sanctions lifted. For a while in 2019, the hashtag “#OpentheBorders” (translated from Farsi) was circulating on Iranian Twitter.9 The idea was that if the Iranian government were to open the Western border with Turkey to Afghan migrants, those migrants would then flood into Southern Europe. Some members of the public and Iranian officials believed the threat of another influx of migrants to Europe would lead to the easing of sanctions as European nations would plead with the United States.9 While the opening of the Western border was not state sanctioned, the retaining of Afghan migrants has become progressively difficult for the Iranian state.
Hosting Afghan migrants and especially Afghan refugees can be quite expensive for Iran. The Iranian government grants Afghan refugees access to subsidized education and healthcare. Furthermore, all Afghan children in Iran were allowed a state-funded primary and secondary education starting in 2015.9 For each of the 500,000 Afghan children that attend school, the Iranian government pays $670 a year and $16,743 annually for each Afghan student who attends Iranian university.9 For some Iranians, these expenses along with others are a reason that Afghan emigration from Iran should be encouraged. Others even go so far as to argue that Iran should deport Afghans to help ease the strain on the economy.9
Final Note
While I can not say for certain whether these increased pressures on the Iranian economy and the Afghan migrants who depend on it will lead to a new migration crisis once the coronavirus pandemic declines and mobility increases, I can say that the economic situation in Iran will continue to worsen unless sanctions are eased. Most notably, Iran’s economic depression will harm those who are already worse off– those who cannot afford to purchase a house in Turkey or come to the United States and those who are already disenfranchised — Iranian Kurds, the poor, and migrants. The simple fact of the matter is people will continue to go hungry, die in protests, and emigrate. Instead of making enemies of millions and viewing debilitating economic sanctions as tools for geopolitical gain, we need to see them for what they are: inhumane. The change in presidential administration is a chance for the U.S. to re-evaluate these sanctions and its relationship with those who call Iran home.
Bibliography
1“Afghanistan Migration Profile.” Kabul: International Organization for Migration, 2014.
2Barbuscia, Davide. “Iran Inflation Could Reach 40 Percent This Year as Economy Shrinks Further – IMF.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 29, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-imf-idUSKCN1S509Q.
3Bektas, Umit. Some Afghan Migrants Travel to Iran in the Hopes of Crossing over the Border into Turkey. Aljazeera. Reuters Thomson, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/f36b2c73325244309c508fe15e217779_18.jpeg.
4Bezhan, Frud. “Afghanistan, The ‘Unintended Casualty’ Of U.S. Sanctions On Iran.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Afghanistan, The ‘Unintended Casualty’ Of U.S. Sanctions On Iran, August 14, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-the-unintended-casualty-of-u-s-sanctions-on-iran/29433904.html.
5Dehghanpisheh, Babak, and Hamid Shalizi. “Afghanistan Feels Impact of Iran’s Economic Isolation.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 25, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-afghanistan-returnees/afghanistan-feels-impact-of-irans-economic-isolation-idUSKCN1S10HO.
6Haas, Hein de, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press, 2020.
7Miles, Tom. “More than 700,000 Afghans Leave Iran as Economy Slows.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 5, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-iran-migrants/more-than-700000-afghans-leave-iran-as-economy-slows-idUSKBN1O4145.
8Mohammadi, Mohammad. “The Impact of Sanctions on Refugees and Migrants in Iran.” Organization for Defending Victims of Violence. Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, 2019. http://www.odvv.org/resources/attachment/1568700747_d2d35e0610cf53bef5318431a41afcdd.pdf.
9Motamedi, Maziar. “Could US Sanctions on Iran Create New Migrant Crisis for Europe?” Business and Economy News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, May 23, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/5/22/could-us-sanctions-on-iran-create-new-migrant-crisis-for-europe.
10“Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report.” International Organization for Migration , September 2020. https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans_situation_report_20-26_sep_2020.pdf.
11The Value of Iran’s Currency Hit Record Lows as a Result of the US Sanctions. December 9, 2019. BBC News. https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/AAA5/production/_106758634_mediaitem106758632.jpg.
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