In my last pair of blog posts I discussed the impact of sanctions imposed on Iran on Iranian emigration rates. I first addressed the effects of recent sanctions on the Iranian economy to provide a bigger picture of what has been going on in the country. I then looked at larger trends in Iranian migration in order to establish patterns of migration responses to triggering events such as economic downfall and deadly protests that can help to explain the recent uptick in Iranian emigration. The second part of my post highlighted more specific occurrences that have happened as a result of sanctions and have contributed to current migration trends. This includes the increase in asylum seeking due the brutal response of the Iranian government on those protesting gas prices, and the increase of middle class migration from Iran to Turkey. In my nexts posts I will focus on the status of migrants currently residing in Iran and the influence that imposed sanctions have had on their lives.
A Brief Overview of Migrants in Iran
Iran is currently host to millions of migrants, including countless refugees mainly from Iraq and Afghanistan.5
In 2014 it was estimated by the Iranian government that 951,142 Afghan refugees and 28,268 Iraqi refugees lived in Iran.6 As of 2019 it has been approximated that there are potentially 2 million undocumented refugees who have settled in the Islamic Republic of Iran.5 The Iranian government carried out a regularization project in 2017 and found over 800,000 Afghan migrants who were unregistered with the state.6 Besides those who have come as refugees, many migrants who reside in Iran have come to the country for financial reasons.
Iran is unique in its role as a destination country for labor migrants. Even when the country was not experiencing a monumental economic crisis as it is now, Iran did not have a particularly high level of fiscal strength compared to many other world players and migration receiving countries. So what makes the nation an attractive destination for labor migrants? This question can partly be answered by the new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory of relative deprivation. The theory of relative deprivation posits that individuals who cannot migrate large distances due to a lack of capability to do so, may migrate to a nearer destination that is comparatively more wealthy than their origin country.3 This theory goes hand-in-hand with American economists Doeringer and Piore’s theory of dual labor markets, which explains why migrants are willing to do the jobs that natives of the origin country won’t do.3 While the situation for laborers in Iran may not be ideal, it is under normal circumstances relatively better wage-wise than those of neighboring countries such as Afghanistan. This explains not only why so many migrants in Iran originate from these nations, but why they are also willing to take on jobs that are oftentimes more dangerous, difficult, and underpaid than the jobs of Iranians.
“The Trump sanctions will put the Iranian economy into a void, and is doing that. (The people) who will first lose a grip on their existence are the Afghan registered and unregistered refugees and migrants.”
Jan Egeland, head of the Norwegian Refugee Council4
While it was reported that over 800,000 Afghans were registered with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2013, the Iranian government estimated that there were 1.5 to 2 million unregistered Afghans living in the country at the time as well.6 The current exact number of Afghan migrants in Iran is unknown, but more recent estimates have put the population at closer to 3 million.4 Many Afghans migrate to Iran for the betterment of their personal and familial financial situations. Through circular labor migration to mainly Pakistan and Iran, Afghan workers are able to send remittances to their families. In fact, the value of money sent home is arguably vital to those who remain in Afghanistan. This is part of a family-based migration strategy that I discussed in a previous blog post on the history and development of migration from Afghanistan to Iran.
Although I go more in-depth on the migration strategies and migration theories that are applicable to the Afghan situation in that post, I will illustrate briefly the reasoning of and importance for Afghan labor migration to Iran. A large portion of Afghanistan’s total remittances come from Iran. The percentage of Afghan households that receive remittances from purely Pakistan or Iran is over 31%.1 Because the government of Afghanistan does not report data related to remittances, some total figures are unknown, but the World Bank has estimated that these remittances account for about 20% of the average rural Afghan family’s daily expenditures.1 29.6% of Afghan households surveyed in 2011 that received remittances cited the money sent to them from abroad as their primary source of income.1 In addition, for the average young Afghan laborer in Iran, 70 to 80 percent of his income is sent to his family in Afghanistan. 1
Due to the fact that such a large portion of migrants in Iran are from Afghanistan, there is far more information about the effects of sanctions on the Afghan population in Iran than any other migrant group. Therefore, I will be specifically focusing on the Afghan migrant community in Iran for my following post.
Bibliography
1“Afghanistan Migration Profile.” Kabul: International Organization for Migration, 2014.
2Dehghanpisheh, Babak, and Hamid Shalizi. “Afghanistan Feels Impact of Iran’s Economic Isolation.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 25, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-afghanistan-returnees/afghanistan-feels-impact-of-irans-economic-isolation-idUSKCN1S10HO.
3Haas, Hein de, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press, 2020.
4Miles, Tom. “More than 700,000 Afghans Leave Iran as Economy Slows.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 5, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-iran-migrants/more-than-700000-afghans-leave-iran-as-economy-slows-idUSKBN1O4145.
5Mohammadi, Mohammad. “The Impact of Sanctions on Refugees and Migrants in Iran.” Organization for Defending Victims of Violence. Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, 2019. http://www.odvv.org/resources/attachment/1568700747_d2d35e0610cf53bef5318431a41afcdd.pdf.
6“Refugees in Iran.” UNHCR Iran. The UN Refugee Agency, 2017. https://www.unhcr.org/ir/refugees-in-iran/.