Tajikistan’s Economic Interdependence on Russia

Framing My Interests 

I have been fascinated by the topic of migrant labor in Central Asia for a number of years now. Part of my interest is rooted in my own personal experiences in Tajikistan. I lived in Tajikistan from 2015 to 2016 when I was 20 years old. I moved to Tajikistan as a Boren Scholar with the main goal of improving my Persian language abilities. I knew next to nothing about Tajikistan, Central Asia, or the history of the Soviet Union before moving to Dushanbe. As a result, I let the young country with a rich, diverse culture wash over me. I leaned heavily on my Tajik friends, teachers, and neighbors to give me a crash course on the country. 

One lesson I quickly learned is that Dushanbe is a facade for the rest of Tajikistan. Even since 2015, the capital has rapidly changed as historic buildings and neighborhoods have been flattened to make room for more perfectly manicured parks and lavish palaces. As a language student with American Councils, I was living in the city center in the middle of the facade. It was not until I began exploring more of the city that I realized that even just a mile or two outside of the facade, there were large swaths of people struggling to get by. 

Likewise, it took some time until I identified labor migration as a prolific aspect of the average Tajik person’s experience. The majority of my Tajik friends were English speaking, part of the professional class of international development workers, and had participated in programs such as FLEX and Fulbright. Many of them had family members who had studied in Russia, but I do not recall any of them mentioning family members who migrated to Russia to work low-skilled jobs. Consequently, I did not realize just how many Tajiks migrated to Russia until I visited the Russian Embassy for a transit visa. I was accompanied by an advisor who took me straight to the front of the line, surely a result of my privilege as a US passport holder. Meanwhile, hundreds of Tajik men were waiting outside the Russian Embassy, most of which seemed to be between the ages of 18 and 40. When I asked my advisor why there were so many men waiting at the embassy, he mentioned the topic of labor migration. It was only then that I began to notice how common labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia is. 

I will share one last anecdote before diving into my research topic. In 2017, I was back in Dushanbe managing a research project developed by Arizona State University and Northwestern University. The study was on water security. I managed nine different enumerators in diverse neighborhoods across the city. In collecting 225 household surveys and 12 long interviews, we encountered many households which were composed of women, children, and the elderly. It was common to hear about families with husbands, fathers, or brothers who left to Russia to work and send home remittances. It was also common to hear about family members who had left to work but either had not been heard from for quite a while or were not always able to consistently send remittance money. I have included a couple of photos from the research. Data collection lasted two weeks and I spent each day shadowing a different enumerator. All photos were taken with the permission of the subjects. 

This was the home of one of the women we interviewed. Because the study was on water security, she was showing us how she accessed and stored the water she used for cleaning. This isn’t a particularly interesting shot, but I wanted to share that this woman was the head of her household. She took care of several children and her elderly mother-in-law. Her husband had gone to Russia to work, but he wasn’t able to send money very often.

This photo was taken at the home of a family we interviewed. The family consisted of exclusively women and children. After the interview, me and the two enumerators I was working with stayed for tea. The daughter of one of the women we interviewed saw my phone said she wanted to take a photo together. She was very adorable.

I was deeply moved by these families who were surviving despite the hardships and uncertainties which come with having a relative of the family living and working from so far away. As a result of my personal experience, I have decided to focus on the topic of labor migration in Tajikistan for my Master’s thesis, and I will use these last two blog posts to get started on certain components of my work. 

For this blog post, I am exploring the resiliency of migrant labor flows during times of economic crisis. In particular, I would like to learn more about the impact which two distinct economic crises in Russia had on flows of Tajik migrant labor. 

Economic Interdependence on Russia

Throughout our readings this semester on Central Asia, we have seen many scholars point to Tajikistan as the country which relies the most heavily on labor migrant remittances from Russia. Tajikistan does not necessarily have the largest number of migrants in Russia as the number of Uzbek migrants in Russia technically surpasses the number of Tajiks, but when compared to the rest of Central Asia, Tajikistan’s economy is the most reliant on Russia’s economy. Many point to data published by the World Bank in 2008 which found that 45% of Tajikistan’s GDP stemmed from migrant labor remittances. Moreover, the World Bank has also found that 96% of Tajik migrant laborers choose to migrate to Russia (Ratha et al, 2008). 

Because the vast majority of Tajik migrants choose to travel to Russia and because such a large proportion of Tajikistan’s economy relies on remittances sent back by laborers, it can be hypothesized that Tajikistan is especially vulnerable to economic crises in Russia. 

Below is a graph depicting personal remittances as a percentage of GDP in Tajikistan. The graph was pulled from the World Bank’s microdata site. From the graph, it is easy to distinguish two sharp periods of decline in Tajik remittances: the period between 2008 and 2009, and the period between 2014 and 2015. It is also clear that after 2016, the amount of remittances as a proportion to GDP in Tajikistan only slightly recovered (The World Bank). 

Defining “Resiliency” in Regard to Migrant Flows

Scholars Ratha and Sirkeci have done interesting work in noting trends that occur among flows of migrant labor in times of economic crisis. 

Namely, during times of economic crisis, there is often a fear of returning home. This fear is rooted in not being able to guarantee whether it will be possible to return to a migrant-receiving country once the economy recovers. Especially if economic crises lead to a tightening in immigration control, migrant laborers often choose to stay and wait out an economic crisis rather than spend the money to return home (Ratha & Sirkeci, 2010). The current economic crisis stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic is difficult to compare to typical economic crises since Covid-19 is also a health crisis which has prompted many border closures. 

From studying data from 2009, Ratha and Sirkeci found three main trends. First, the more spread out among various countries a migrant population is, the more resilient it is. Based on this finding, one would guess that Tajik migrant labor is vulnerable since the majority of Tajik laborers go to Russia. The second trend is that the lower the barriers to labor mobility, the stronger the link between remittances and economic cycles. This trend is difficult to apply to Tajikistan since Tajiks receive 90-day visa-free travel to Russia, but the barriers to acquiring a legal work permit are high (Schenk, 2010). The third trend is that many dependent countries become even more dependent on remittance inflows during times of economic crisis (Ratha & Sirkeci, 2010). 

The 2008/2009 Great Recession

Russia’s oil prices plunged in late 2008 and the recession for Russia subsequently lasted throughout 2009. Although the portion of Tajikistan’s GDP which consists of exports is low, its domestic labor market also experienced a blow as the cost of aluminum and cotton commodities dropped. Due to Tajikistan’s external dependence on Russia’s economy, it became particularly vulnerable to the global financial crisis in 2008. 

When analyzing the World Bank Tajikistan Living Standards Survey last administered in 2009, scholars Danzer and Ivaschenko found that while the amount of remittance money decreased because of the global financial crisis, the number of Tajik labor migrants actually increased. This is described in relation to the Push-Pull Model. There was a reduction in pull-factors due to the recession, but the recession led to an increase in push factors. Overall, the researchers came to three main findings. 

1. The Great Recession led to a substantial increase in labor migration between Tajikistan and Russia. 
2. There was increased uncertainty in migrating since many began migrating without knowledge of a secure job in Russia. 
3. There was a decline in the overall financial gains from migrating. 

These trends fit into the concept of a “remittances curse”. Essentially, it is argued that Tajikistan is so dependent on remittances that during times of economic crisis, many households may have no other choice than to extend migration further. 

Moreover, due to the decline of the construction market during the first three quarters of 2009, there was less opportunity for men to find work in Russia since construction is such an important sector. Since migrant-sending families had little options to diversity in location, families began diversifying household earning structures by sending more women to Russia to work. While sectors such as oil and constructions declined during periods of economic crisis, other sectors such as the service sector were more suitable for female migrants and were more secure (Danzer & Ivaschenko, 2009). 

Overall, analyzing the Great Recession further demonstrates how vulnerable Tajikistan’s economy is to global economic crises. However, I am not sure how much of this research on the 2008/2009 crisis may compare to the economic crisis resulting from Covid-19 since the nature of a health crisis is so different from the nature of an economic crisis. 

Russia’s 2014 Economic Crisis

Although less widely studied, an economic crisis in Russia in 2014 directly affected Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan. In 2014, a drop in the global oil price and Western sanctions led to an economic crisis in Russia. Schenkkan deliberately points to the connection between Central Asian economies and the Russian economy noting that currencies are closely linked and drops in Russia’s economy lead to drops in remittances from migrant laborers. As a result, the Tajik National Bank spent $137 million in 2014 trying to steady its country’s currency (Schenkkan, 2015). 

Discussion and Next Steps

Tajikistan’s economic interdependence on Russia makes it all the more vulnerable to economic changes and crises. Interestingly, past financial crises have shown that instead of reducing numbers of migrant laborers during times of crisis, Tajik migrant laborers to Russia have actually increased. Overall, it has been important for me to take a look at these two cases in order to better understand those sharp drops in remittances reflected through World Bank data, but I am not sure how much these economic crises reveal about what is happening today. 

For my thesis work, I’d like to start with a broad question: How has the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic impacted the flow of migrant labor from Tajikistan to Russia? Tajik migrants were able to remain resilient to the 2008 Great Recession by “doubling down” on migrant-sending and by loosening gender norms in order to send more women to work within diversified sectors. Yet, I do not think that migrants have been able to be as resilient during the current pandemic due to border closures and Covid-19 health risks. In order to learn more about what is currently happening, I am planning on using social media data to gather qualitative data on how online communities of Tajik laborers are interacting during the pandemic. This is what I plan to begin working on for my next blog post. 

Sourcing:

Danzer, A.M. and Ivaschenko, O. (2009) “Labor Migration, Remittances and Welfare Implications for Tajikistan”, In: The World Bank: Republic of Tajikistan Poverty Assessment, Chapter 4.

Ratha, D., Sirkeci, I. (2010) “Remittances and the global financial crisis”. Migration Letters 2:125-131.

Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S. and Xu, Z. (2008) “Outlook for Remittance Flows 2008-2010: Growth Expected to Moderate Significantly, but Flows to Remain Resilient”, Migration and Development Brief 8, The World Bank: Washington D.C.

Schenk, C. (2010) “Open Border, Closed Minds: Russia’s Changing Migration Policies. Liberalization or Xenophobia?” Demokratizatsiya Vol. 18 (2)

Schenkkan, N. (2015) “Impact of the Economic Crisis in Russia on Central Asia”, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 165: 3-6

The World Bank, “Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) – Tajikistan, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2019&locations=TJ&start=2002&view=chart