The 2020 Covid-19 global pandemic has exacerbated social and economic struggles in Central Asia while strengthening Russia and China’s grasp over the region. While stronger relations with Russia and China can help the five governments of Central Asia appear more legitimate, little progress will be gained for the people of Central Asia. Migrant laborers will continue being utilized in an easily expendable flow of human capital, and China’s growing investment will not trickle down to everyday Central Asians.
Spheres of Influence
There are several foreign powers which have looked toward Central Asia to exert their power. Arguably, the two strongest of these powers are Russia and China. With historical and cultural ties in Central Asia, Russia continues to be a key player in the region. Following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, Russian interests in the five nations of Central Asia have lied mostly in security. Russia has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and in 2002, Russia founded the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia also continues to claim strong cultural ties, especially with countries such as Kazakhstan which have relatively large populations of ethnic Russians. Since the mid-1990s, China has also begun looking toward Central Asia with motivations related to economics and security (Kangas, 2020).
China began to gaze westward past its historically Muslim province of Xinjiang or East Turkestan in the 1990s, and since then, each Central Asian country has had a slightly different economic relationship with China. A key trade trend is the import of Chinese products into Central Asia and the export of raw materials to China (Kangas, 2020).
Most recently China has been heavily investing in Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and various BRI financial institutions. The most well known of these institutions is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), but there are also the China Development Bank, and the New Silk Road Fund (Aminjonov et al, 2020).
China has been investing in Central Asia through BRI since 2013. According to a 2019 report published by the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, China has 261 BRI projects in Central Asia. The majority of the Chinese projects in Central Asia are bilateral, and “the total number of projects in these areas approximates the number of projects in all other areas combined”, thus Central Asia is a priority region for China (Aminjonov et al, 2020).
Listed below is a chart produced by the OSCE Academy in Biskek in 2019. Out of the 261 BRI projects in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is China’s strongest bilateral partner. However, Kazakhstan has the most robust economy in Central Asia, so despite its high number of BRI projects, Kazakhstan may be less reliant on Chinese investment than countries in Central Asia with smaller economies (Aminjonov et al, 2020).
Below is another chart produced by the OSCE Academy. You’ll note that China invests the most in sectors such as energy exploration, energy connectivity, and infrastructure such as road building. China invests the least in finance and IT and people-to-people projects (Aminjonov et al, 2020).
Covid-19 and a Great Power Shift
Prior to the Coronavirus pandemic which continues to loom large, China and Russia were becoming increasingly friendly over their relations with Central Asia. The priorities of these two countries in Central Asia had been seen as mutually exclusive, and leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping even met in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in 2019. Photos show the two presidents clinking champagne glasses. Other popular photos of this event highlight a beautiful bowl of Tajik apricots, a great source of agricultural pride in countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
As the Coronavirus continues to ravage the economies of Central Asia, it is becoming clear that power in Central Asia is shifting yet again. The Coronavirus has conveniently made the region even more open to and reliant on Chinese investment. Yet, due to the nature of Chinese investment and China’s disinterest in investing in the Central Asian populace, Russia will continue in its ability to exploit Central Asian labor, despite its own ravaged economy, growth in Xenophobic perspectives, and far-right politicians which look to migrants as scapegoats.
The Hardship of Closed Borders
Within my last blog post, I argued that Russia’s use of Central Asian migrant labor fits into De Hass’ description of historical-structural migration theory. Central Asians in Russia tend to be discriminated against and treated poorly. Meanwhile, Central Asian migrants can be hired or fired at-will and are quickly blamed for problems within Russian society. Yet, the Russian economy greatly benefits from the use of this inexpensive labor. Overall, Covid-19 has further proven Russian attitudes toward Central Asian migrants as expendable.
There are countless news publications, especially from March, April, and May 2020 which show groups of Central Asian migrants stranded in Russian airports, train stations, and borders just waiting for the ability to be able to return to their homelands. These migrants were left in extremely precarious situations. The majority of migrant labor is unofficial, meaning that migrants are typically the first to get fired during times of economic hardship. Since the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, Central Asian migrants were left with no way to earn an income in Russia, yet unable to return to their home countries due to closed borders.
An article published by Ferghana News shares a video taken by a group of Tajik nations stuck on the Russian border.
“Мы тут живем, как бомжи. У нас же есть родина — Таджикистан. Узбекистанцам помогли, а нам никто не помогает. Даже местные русские спрашивают: неужели вашим властям на вас наплевать?» — говорит голос за кадром.”
“We live here like homeless people. We have a homeland – Tajikistan. They helped the Uzbek people, but no one helps us. Even local Russians ask whether the authorities really care about us.”
Yet, because of low job prospects and even weaker economies in Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, migrants are eagerly waiting for the chance to return to Russia to work. A Radio Free Europe article from May touched on this exact issue.
As hundreds of Central Asian are trying to leave Russia, thousands more are hoping to move in the opposite direction, toward Russia.
In the southern Tajik province of Khatlon, Shorahmat Alimov says he is constantly checking news on when the borders will reopen so he can go back to the Russian city of Surgut, a popular destination for many Central Asian migrants.
“The coronavirus is everywhere now,” Alimov says. “In Tajikistan, I face both the virus and hunger. I want to take my chances and go to Russia to look for work.”
Due to conditions within home countries, Russia will continue being able to exploit Central Asian labor as soon as borders reopen.
China’s Disinterest in Human Development
While investing heavily in energy and infrastructure, China has had little inclination to build the workforce of its Central Asian hosts. Instead, Chinese BRI projects tend to import many of their own teams of Chinese workers. While these investment projects are great in the eyes of Central Asian government leaders, there tend to be clashes at the local level. The Washington Post has reported conflict between Kyrgyz and Chinese workers, and there seems to be a local perception in Kyrgyzstan that Chinese workers are marrying Kyrgyz women en masse. While the actual numbers of ethnic Chinese in Central Asia remains quite low, local perceptions do not seem to be overall positive (Jardine, 2019).
Final Thoughts
Putin and Xi will continue clinking glasses over the harships of Central Asia well into the future. China’s BRI projects do not increase in-country human capital as China has always been keen on importing their own companies and migrant laborers. Meanwhile, Central Asians from countries such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan will continue to migrate to Russia to work low-skilled jobs in pursuit of adequate wages.
Citations
Aminjonov, Farkhod et al., “BRI in Central Asia: Overview of Chinese Projects”, Central Asia Regional Data Review, (2019) 20: 1-5
De Haas, Hein, Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. 6th edition. New York: Guilford Press. ISBN 9781462542895
Ferghana News, “Никому до нас нет дела” (July 17, 2020) https://fergana.agency/videos/120244/
Jardine, Bradley, “Why are there anti-China protests in Central Asia?”, The Washington Post (October 16, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/16/why-are-there-anti-china-protests-central-asia/
Kangas, Roger, “Understanding Russia and China in Central Asia”, American Foreign Policy Council (July 8, 2020) https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/understanding-russia-and-china-in-central-asia
Najibullah, Farangis, “Stranded In Russia With No Money, Desperate Central Asian Migrants Face Tough Choices”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (May 17, 2020) https://www.rferl.org/a/centra-asian-migrants-stranded-russia-covid-no-money-desperate/30616792.html
You mentioned China’s heavy influence on Central Asia through the BRI and other projects, but it would be interesting to learn more about Central Asians’ opinions on the Chinese people. Obviosuly, Xinjiang and the Uighur population has become a much talked-about issue lately, so it would be interesting to hear about how Central Asians view China in light of their treatment of fellow Central Asians in China.
Hi Monet
I really appreciate the variety of sources you’ve presented in this post, they paint a very clear picture of the current diplomatic situation in Central Asia. While the COVID-19 pandemic has definitely highlighted some of the preexisting problems of economic relationships in Central Asia, it has also quite obviously drastically changed the circumstances surrounding these relationships. The extreme mistreatments of stranded Central Asian workers in the face of Russia’s growing labor needs is curious to say the least. With that being said, how do you think Russian and Chinese foreign policy will change in light of the recent “revolution” in Kyrgyzstan? Will they try and take advantage of the political instability, and if so, how do you think that would that impact migrant workers?
in paragraph 2: lie (intransitive) and lay (transitive) are surely two of the most annoying irregular verbs in the English language, but in any case the form you were looking for in that sentence was “have lain”. Here’s the helpful grammarly explanation: https://www.grammarly.com/blog/lay-lie/ Sorry. Professors distracted by past participles are like cats distracted by lasers.
Bigger picture: you are examining development in Central Asia and the way that two different big economic actors work. Russia relies on Tajik and other migrant labor. China does development projects in Central Asia, but using Chinese labor, not Central Asian labor. Here’s a publication that gives a recent gage of Central Asian views of Russia, China, and the US. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-56-no-great-game-central-asias-public-opinions-russia-china-and-us We can see that all of that coming and going to Russia has a hugely positive impact on public opinion of Russia.
Hi Monet, I really enjoyed this article! I’m sure we’ll see some new development in Kyrgyzstan very soon considering the political changes. Do you think the BRI will be looked favorably upon by the Kyrgyz population in the future considering their cultural apprehensions in integrating Chinese workers? It struck me earlier this year that many Central Asian nations and groups had fallen silent on the treatment of the Uyghur people of Turkestan. Do you think this trend indicates a greater acceptance of the BRI and Chinese collaboration as opposed to greater regional cooperation?